# On the Relation Between Moral Philosophy & Moral Psychology **Author:** Bree Beal **Published:** January 31, 2025 **Source:** https://breebeal.substack.com/p/on-the-relation-between-moral-philosophy **Snapshot note:** Non-authoritative, normalized reading copy prepared from the public page for this archive. Original images and reader comments are omitted, and minor wording/formatting normalization may be present. Treat the live post or an author export as canonical.** ## 1. Context Over my years of research in moral psychology—a field at the intersection of psychology and philosophy—one conceptual misunderstanding has been a constant theme. I’ve never dedicated an entire essay to addressing this problem, maybe because it seemed too small to me—a common misconception that moral psychologists must combat with a line or two at the beginning of every article they publish. But it strikes me now that, if the problem is so persistent, it’s worth a couple pages. The outcome might be a small but useful resource for those with a similar frustration. The problem is this: The meaning of “moral” in most discussions of moral philosophy is importantly different from the meaning of “moral” in most discussions of moral psychology. However, people routinely conflate these meanings—typically by reading the philosophical meaning of “moral” into a text on psychology. And when they do this, they inevitably misunderstand what the psychologist is trying to do. It is tempting to look for a grammatical solution—for instance, by imposing a distinction between “ethical” and “moral,” words that historically are synonyms, or by forcing an existing distinction like that between “moral norm” and “convention” to do more work than it was meant to do. The problem with these grammatical solutions is that they cannot be sufficiently rigorous. The words continue to carry much of their colloquial meaning, and it is hard to overcome the biases of our grammar. The only solution is to analyze the relation between moral philosophy and moral psychology and describe the different senses of the central concepts in sufficient detail. ## 2. Two meanings for “moral” and three meanings for “normative” I will use the idea of a “moral belief” for illustration. When a philosopher develops or defends a theory of what is morally right or wrong, they are using “moral” in a particular way. A moral belief in this context is a belief that is morally defensible—a belief that, from this perspective, is worthy of being shared by others. This is a legitimate use of the term. But it is not the only one. When a moral psychologist investigates how moral beliefs take shape in minds, they are concerned with something broader. It is not up to the psychologist to weigh in on thousands of years of disagreement over which beliefs are valid. Instead, the psychologist must consider as moral any beliefs that share the psychological features of a moral belief. Defining those distinguishing features is difficult, and psychologists have failed to reach consensus over a strict definition. Regardless of how moral psychologists define a moral belief, many beliefs in the psychological class will be ideas that other people reject as indefensible or even immoral. These are therefore “immoral beliefs” that, from a psychological perspective, are properly described as “moral beliefs.” This is semantically confusing, but there is no simple way around it. How could one account for moral cognition while restricting analysis to the moral beliefs espoused by a few philosophical traditions? That would be like studying color vision while defining color exclusively as red. A psychologist who could not analyze beliefs they reject would be unable to explain cult members willing to die for an “evil” cause. The psychologist could only shrug and say: “That’s not my area. Go talk to an immoral psychologist.” The situation is even worse because “norm,” in the sense of a belief about how one ought to behave, has at least three distinct meanings. Sometimes norm refers exclusively to moral norms. But moral norms may be understood either in the narrow sense of defensible moral norms or in the broader sense of norms derived in the characteristic way moral norms are derived. Additionally, there are many beliefs about how one ought to behave that do not bear the characteristic structure of moral belief: “If I want to assemble this chair, I ought to tighten this screw.” Under most conditions this ought is instrumental and nonmoral. Yet it is still normative because tightening the screw really is correct, right, or appropriate if one wants to assemble the chair properly. There is therefore a larger category of nonmoral norms. Replacing “nonmoral norm” with “social convention” does not solve the problem. A social convention connotes accepted opinion in a cultural context, while the screw example is not a matter of opinion. In the specified context, there is a correct thing to do. This ought is neither a moral obligation nor a mere convention; it is a nonmoral normative inference. Psychologists often draw a distinction between prescriptive moral philosophy and descriptive moral psychology. But readers may still be confused because what psychologists merely describe is itself prescriptive. To address these levels, I have elsewhere spoken of first-, second-, and third-order normativity. First-order normativity is the set of all normative beliefs. Second-order normativity is the smaller set of moral beliefs. Moral beliefs are second-order because they are norms about norms: when someone asserts that a norm is moral, they are saying not only that people happen to believe action A is correct, but that people should believe action A is correct. It is correct to think that action A is correct—one should believe that one should do A. There is also third-order normativity. The set of all moral beliefs shares the hallmark of second-order normativity, but beliefs about which moral beliefs are defensible are third-order norms: normative attitudes about normative attitudes about normative attitudes. This third-order normativity is what philosophers are usually discussing when debating whether an action or intention is moral. Each movement from a larger set to a smaller subset expresses a normative judgment. The judgment narrows from a larger set of possibilities to a smaller subset viewed as more correct, right, or appropriate. Moving from first- to second- to third-order norms means applying a narrowing function to a set that is already narrowed from a set already narrowed from all possible beliefs. Any time someone says that a particular action is right, correct, or appropriate, they are locating it within a smaller subset of actions that should be taken. This subset may itself contain actions that, under another set of criteria, are judged better or worse. We therefore end up with subsets within subsets. Differences between subsets arise because the normative narrowing function is enacted over different criteria. For example, narrowing from all norms to moral norms is determined by the introduction of moral relationships, which have their own computational structure. In every case, normative narrowing means moving from a larger set of possible beliefs or behaviors to a smaller subset of correct, right, or appropriate beliefs or behaviors. I won’t here get into the criteria that distinguish moral norms from other norms. For now: Are you picking up what I’m throwing down?