Project bibliography

Beal, B. L. (2018). Raskolnikov’s confession: A Dostoevskian model of moral psychology [Doctoral dissertation, Emory University].

Beal, B. (2020). What are the irreducible basic elements of morality? A critique of the debate over monism and pluralism in moral psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 15(2), 273–290.

Beal, B. (2021). The nonmoral conditions of moral cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 34(8), 1097–1124.

Beal, B., & Gogia, G. (2021). Cognition in moral space: A minimal model. Consciousness and Cognition, 92, Article 103134.

Beal, B. (2022). The polyphony principle. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, Article e222.

Beal, B., & Rottman, J. (2024). Nonmoral beliefs are better predictors of moral judgments than moral values [Submitted manuscript; project-held version].

Beal, B. (2025a, January 20). The is-to-ought model of moral cognition. Bree’s Substack.

Beal, B. (2025b, January 31). On the relation between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Bree’s Substack.

Beal, B. (2026). A thousand Ramanujans. Bree’s Substack.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Basil Blackwell. Cited passage: §33, p. 60.

Aquinas, T. (1920). Summa theologiae (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Trans.; 2nd rev. ed.). New Advent, online reproduction. Cited passage: I–II, question 94, article 2.

Aristotle. (n.d.-a). On the motion of animals [De motu animalium] (A. S. L. Farquharson, Trans.). Internet Classics Archive. Cited passage: part 7.

Aristotle. (n.d.-b). Nicomachean ethics (W. D. Ross, Trans.). Online text hosted by Boston University. Cited passages: books I–II.

Arpaly, N. (2003). Unprincipled virtue: An inquiry into moral agency. Oxford University Press. Cited chapter: “Moral worth,” pp. 67–116.

Atari, M., Haidt, J., Graham, J., Koleva, S., Stevens, S. T., & Dehghani, M. (2023). Morality beyond the WEIRD: How the nomological network of morality varies across cultures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 125(5), 1157–1188.

Bai, Y., Kadavath, S., Kundu, S., Askell, A., Kernion, J., Jones, A., Chen, A., Goldie, A., Mirhoseini, A., McKinnon, C., Chen, C., Olsson, C., Olah, C., Hernandez, D., Drain, D., Ganguli, D., Li, D., Tran-Johnson, E., Perez, E., … Kaplan, J. (2022). Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI feedback [Preprint]. arXiv.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1984). Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics (C. Emerson, Ed. & Trans.). University of Minnesota Press.

Batson, C. D., Klein, T. R., Highberger, L., & Shaw, L. L. (1995). Immorality from empathy-induced altruism: When compassion and justice conflict. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68(6), 1042–1054.

Bentham, J. (n.d.). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. University of Texas at Austin, online text. Cited passage: chapter I, §II.

Crimston, D., Bain, P. G., Hornsey, M. J., & Bastian, B. (2016). Moral expansiveness: Examining variability in the extension of the moral world. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 111(4), 636–653.

Curry, O. S., Mullins, D. A., & Whitehouse, H. (2019). Is it good to cooperate? Testing the theory of morality-as-cooperation in 60 societies. Current Anthropology, 60(1), 47–69.

Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011). Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations. Cognitive Science, 35(6), 1052–1075.

Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. Oxford University Press.

Davidson, D. (2006). Intending. In E. Lepore & K. Ludwig (Eds.), The essential Davidson (pp. 122–137). Oxford University Press. (Original essay published 1978.)

Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79(1–2), 1–37.

Di Paolo, E. A. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 429–452.

Dung, P. M. (1995). On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. Artificial Intelligence, 77(2), 321–357.

Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., & Pezzulo, G. (2017). Active inference: A process theory. Neural Computation, 29(1), 1–49.

Gaertner, S. L., Mann, J., Murrell, A., & Dovidio, J. F. (1989). Reducing intergroup bias: The benefits of recategorization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(2), 239–249.

Gilligan, C. (1993). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development (with a new letter to readers). Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1982.)

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. In P. Devine & A. Plant (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 47, pp. 55–130). Academic Press.

Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366–385.

Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. Science, 315(5812), 619.

Gray, K., & Pratt, S. (2025). Morality in our mind and across cultures and politics. Annual Review of Psychology, 76, 663–691.

Gray, K., MacCormack, J. K., Henry, T., Banks, E., Schein, C., Armstrong-Carter, E., Abrams, S., & Muscatell, K. A. (2022). The affective harm account (AHA) of moral judgment: Reconciling cognition and affect, dyadic morality and disgust, harm and purity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 123(6), 1199–1222.

Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834.

Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, 133(4), 55–66.

Halpern, J. Y., & Pearl, J. (2005). Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part I: Causes. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(4), 843–887.

Hart, H. L. A., & Honoré, T. (1985). Causation in the law (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Heidegger, M. (2010). Being and time: A revised edition of the Stambaugh translation (J. Stambaugh, Trans.; D. J. Schmidt, Rev. & Foreword). State University of New York Press. (Original work published 1927.)

Held, V. (1995). The meshing of care and justice. Hypatia, 10(2), 128–132.

Hendrycks, D., Burns, C., Basart, S., Critch, A., Li, J., Song, D., & Steinhardt, J. (2021). Aligning AI with shared human values. International Conference on Learning Representations. arXiv:2008.02275.

Herman, B. (1993). The practice of moral judgment. Harvard University Press. Cited chapter: “On the value of acting from the motive of duty,” pp. 1–22.

Horty, J. F. (2012). Reasons as defaults. Oxford University Press.

Hume, D. (n.d.). A treatise of human nature. Hume Texts Online. Cited passages: 2.3.3.3, 2.3.3.8, and 3.1.1.27; SBN pp. 414, 417, and 469–470.

Kant, I. (2002). Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (A. W. Wood, Ed. & Trans.). Yale University Press. (Original work published 1785.)

Kant, I. (2012). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (M. Gregor & J. Timmermann, Eds. & Trans.; 2nd ed.; C. M. Korsgaard, Introduction). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1785.)

Kleiman-Weiner, M., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2017). Learning a commonsense moral theory. Cognition, 167, 107–123.

Kumar, V. (2016). The empirical identity of moral judgment. The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(265), 783–804.

Laurenceau, J.-P., Barrett, L. F., & Pietromonaco, P. R. (1998). Intimacy as an interpersonal process: The importance of self-disclosure, partner disclosure, and perceived partner responsiveness in interpersonal exchanges. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5), 1238–1251.

Levinas, E. (1991). Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (A. Lingis, Trans.). Kluwer Academic Publishers. (French original published 1961; English translation first published 1969.) Cited section: “Ethics and the face,” p. 198.

Levine, S., Chater, N., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Cushman, F. (2026). Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 49, Article e133.

Lord, E., & Sylvan, K. (2020). Prime time (for the basing relation). In J. A. Carter & P. Bondy (Eds.), Well-founded belief: New essays on the epistemic basing relation (pp. 141–173). Routledge.

Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Penguin Books. Cited passage: chapter 1, §2, p. 17.

Makinson, D., & van der Torre, L. (2007). What is input/output logic? Input/output logic, constraints, permissions. In G. Boella, L. van der Torre, & H. Verhagen (Eds.), Normative multi-agent systems (Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Vol. 07122, pp. 1–12). Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik.

Markovits, J. (2010). Acting for the right reasons. The Philosophical Review, 119(2), 201–242.

McCain, K. (2012). The interventionist account of causation and the basing relation. Philosophical Studies, 159(3), 357–382.

Much, N. C., & Shweder, R. A. (1978). Speaking of rules: The analysis of culture in breach. In W. Damon (Ed.), New directions in child development (pp. 19–39). Jossey-Bass.

Neta, R. (2015). Basing is conjuring. Minds Online.

Neta, R. (2019). The basing relation. The Philosophical Review, 128(2), 179–217.

Nichols, S. (2002). Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral judgment. Cognition, 84(2), 221–236.

Pollock, J. L. (1987). Defeasible reasoning. Cognitive Science, 11(4), 481–518.

Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011). Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. Psychological Review, 118(1), 57–75.

Ramezani, A., & Xu, Y. (2025). Moral association graph: A cognitive model for automated moral inference. Topics in Cognitive Science, 17(1), 120–138.

Ross, W. D. (1930). The right and the good. Clarendon Press. Cited passage: chapter 2, p. 28.

Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cited passage: chapter 5, p. 189.

Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018). The theory of dyadic morality: Reinventing moral judgment by redefining harm. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 22(1), 32–70.

Searle, J. R. (1964). How to derive “ought” from “is.” The Philosophical Review, 73(1), 43–58.

Shweder, R. A. (1992). Ghost busters in anthropology. In R. G. D’Andrade & C. Strauss (Eds.), Human motives and cultural models (pp. 45–58). Cambridge University Press.

Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M., & Miller, J. G. (1987). Culture and moral development. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb (Eds.), The emergence of morality in young children (pp. 1–83). University of Chicago Press.

Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The “big three” of morality (autonomy, community, divinity) and the “big three” explanations of suffering. In A. M. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), Morality and health (pp. 119–172). Routledge.

Silva, P., Jr. (2015). Does doxastic justification have a basing requirement? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(2), 371–387.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Wheatley, T. (2014). Are moral judgments unified? Philosophical Psychology, 27(4), 451–474.

Sliwa, P. (2016). Moral worth and moral knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(2), 393–418.

Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge University Press.

Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., & Diermeier, D. (2015). A person-centered approach to moral judgment. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(1), 72–81.

Van Bavel, J. J., Packer, D. J., Haas, I. J., & Cunningham, W. A. (2012). The importance of moral construal: Moral versus non-moral construal elicits faster, more extreme, universal evaluations of the same actions. PLOS ONE, 7(11), Article e48693.

Wainryb, C. (2004). “Is” and “ought”: Moral judgments about the world as understood. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 2004(103), 3–18.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Basil Blackwell. Cited passages: §§65–67.

Wright, R. W. (1985). Causation in tort law. California Law Review, 73(6), 1735–1828.

Austin, M. W. (n.d.). Divine command theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Cited section: §4d. Retrieved September 7, 2026.

Mack, E. (2026, June 3). Robert Nozick’s political philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Cited section: §2. Retrieved September 7, 2026.